That Ontological Arguments for the Existence of God
Always Beg the Question

In 2003 I published on the internet, in a page on Leibniz, an Ontological Argument, partly original to me, that I could not find the slightest thing wrong with at the time. The following will enumerate and expand on this quite convincing argument as I constructed it at the time:

Leibniz held that if God is logically possible, he must exist. Many philosophers hold this view right now, due to modal logic considerations that came after Leibniz. Leibniz believed this not because of the contemporary reasons, however, but because of Anselm's Ontological Argument. Basically he felt Anselm had proved God if one thing could be established--that it was logically possible for there to be a God. If not, Anselm's argument didn't work; that was the only thing lacking, to show that God was possible.

But the contemporary view that if God is possible, God must exist, is for much more definite and formally valid reasons. It can be shown without a doubt, using conventional symbolic logic, that, "If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P," P being any proposition at all. The forms of this proof are various but easy to reach with any number of clearly true axioms. The following is my own:

Axiom: If possibly not P then not possibly necessarily P.

This is true enough, and the rest follows:

1) If not not possibly necessarily P then not possibly not P.

2) If possibly necessarily P then not possibly not P.

Conclusion: If possibly necessarily P then necessarily P.

What this means is that, not if something is possible it is necessary or even true, but that anything that is possibly necessary is true and necessary. So according to this idea, God, being that, if he exists, he necessarily exists (according to his definition), if God is possible--that is, if there is no contradiction in his concept or attributes--he exists.

So all that is lacking is to show that there is no contradiction in God, and we have proven him. The following argumentation is my own to show that God is possible:

God is defined as having only absolutely positive (good) attributes. Now, can one good attribute contradict another good attribute, and both remain good? If a judge being merciful is an absolute good, and letting a murderer not suffer death is this mercy; and being just is an absolute good, and letting the murderer die for his crime is this good justice, can both this good mercy and this good justice coexist as absolute goods? Obviously in an ethically relativist world everything is good and nothing is good; but God is good absolutely, and contains only absolute goods. Could God ever do either one act or its contrary, both options being absolute goods regardless? Can attribute P be absolutely good and contradict attribute Q, which is equally an absolute good, without one or the other not after all being an absolute good?

The "absolutely good" is not a class of objects, such as "dogs" or "colleges". It is a class of attributes; God is said to have attributes, and all those attributes are "good". Thus, one attribute--so long as we are dealing in absolute goods--cannot contradict any other, while both remain good. The class of "absolutely good attributes" must be internally consistent much in the way that the class of "true propositions" must be internally consistent. Each attribute or its contrary is good; a contradiction in God's attributes--when God has only the good--would require one and the same attribute to be both good and not good. Letting a murderer free of the death penalty is merciful; killing him is just; but both acts cannot simultaneously be considered the absolute good. If they were, then both executing the murderer and not executing the murderer could be good actions, absolutely; which is absurd.

Thus, I supposed, there must be no contradiction in God, since God contains only absolutely good attributes; this God must therefore be internally consistent, and so he is possible. Add this to the idea that if God is possible he exists, and there we have proof that he exists. For a long time, as I said, I was astonished that there was nothing wrong with this reasoning. But there was one thing that troubled me, and it finally led me to realize my error years later: This argument proves not only God's existence, but that of the Devil. Not any Devil inferior in wisdom or power to God--a Devil every bit as omnipotent as God himself. The following reasoning will show this: God is defined as having only good attributes. But is omnipotence good? Obviously power is good in the hands of the ethically good, and bad in the hands of the ethically bad. God is all-knowing as well; so likewise with knowledge: so long as the thing that possesses it is good, knowledge is good; so long as the thing that has knowledge is bad, that knowledge is not positive but negative. Give God omniscience and omnipotence, and obviously he is better: give the Devil (capitalized here because he is now equal to God, as we shall see) omniscience and omnipotence, and obviously he is worse.

So now: I have a concept of a Devil, an omnipotent and all-knowing Devil, in power, origin and knowledge God's equal, a Devil who is a necessary being whose existence follows from his essence; who, instead of having only absolutely positive (good) attributes, has only absolutely negative. Thus, with a similar but inverted argument as the one above that showed there is no contradiction in God, we see there is no contradiction in this Devil. And it being part of this concept that this Devil is necessary, if he is possible (which I have shown), he is possibly necessary, and thus necessary. It does us no good to suppose that, while the conventional definition of God is that he is necessary, this is not so of the Devil. For it is yet possible to conceive of this Devil I have proposed; and the Ontological Argument argues not about conventional definitions, but says that if it is possible to conceive a certain God, he must be.

Before we jump to the conclusion that we are living in some Zoroastrian cosmos with good and evil equal in power, let us see where we made our error.

We may apply this "possible to conceive" principle upon which the Ontological Arguments hang and find other absurdities as well. I propose that there is a blind beggar in Calcutta named Arthur, with blond hair, whose existence follows from his essence (is necessary). I then find some principle whereby there is no contradiction in this Arthur (which is certainly feasible, and we may alter his properties as needed to allow for it). Thus, the very concept of this Arthur being that he is necessary, if he is possible he is necessary; and since there is no contradiction in him, there you go: I have proven a priori that there is a blind beggar in Calcutta, with blond hair, named Arthur. It is certainly possible to conceive this Arthur being necessary, and we have shown that he cannot be impossible; thus we know he exists because it is possible to conceive him.

Obviously there is an error here. What it is, is that I have offered as a premise the very thing under question: that this Arthur exists. I have "conceived" as this Arthur as a necessary being. A necessary being is one whose existence follows from its essence, and who has to, and must, exist. Thus, I have "conceived" that this Arthur actually exists as a premise, and proven with this premise that he exists. To conceive something as necessary implies conceiving that it exists. This is the way all forms of the Ontological Argument function--they "conceive" of (that is, suppose) God as necessary (that is, really exists), and then they proceed to prove that he must actually exist using this as a premise. They all, then, offer as a premise the very thing we are questioning: that God exists.

They hide this error in two ways. One is that to define a being as necessary is one step removed from--but nonetheless logically implies--that he exists. God is defined as a necessary being, and any necessary being must exist. It is often said in criticism of the Ontological Argument that it "defines" God into existence, and indeed this is precisely what it does. But the argument's defenders concede the point that nothing can be "defined" into existence; so they content themselves with defining God as necessary, and call this merely what we "conceive" him to be, leaving aside the question of his existence for the debate. But to define (or, if you will, "conceive") God as necessary is precisely to enter as a premise that he does in fact exist. Obviously if I conceive that "Arthur is blind and has blond hair" and suppose this as a premise, it will follow that "Arthur is blind and has blond hair." When we define God as a necessary being, we are defining him as actually existing; every necessary being exists, so slipping God "conceived" as necessary into the premises is obviously going to produce the conclusion that he exists. Suppose any being to be necessary as a premise--any being whatsoever--and you will be able to prove it exists. Whether God is "conceived" or "defined" as necessary is precisely the question we are debating when we debate his existence.

Let us unpack the second way the Ontological Argument deceives us. It is said that it is not a premise that God is necessary (that is, exists), but necessity is merely God's "conception". We are not presupposing God is necessary, we are "conceiving" that God is necessary; obviously it is possible to conceive this, so we must see what follows from the conception. Well, it is possible to conceive a lot of things; it is possible to conceive that the moon is made of cheese, and it follows from this conception--if we take it as true--that the moon is made of cheese. There is no logical difference between "conceiving" something or "supposing it" or "putting it forth as a premise". All of these are synonymous. If I conceive, after the manner of defining, my left pocket as holding a five-dollar bill, obviously with this "conception" I can prove that I have in my left pocket a five-dollar bill. If Spinoza had defined Man as unfree in his geometric demonstrations (which he did not, since he knew it would be sophistry), he could obviously "prove" from this definition that Man is unfree. To define God as necessary is to define him as existing; and as much as the theist will attempt to subtract "existence" for sake of not begging the question from God's definition as "necessary", yet it is obvious that any being defined as having property P in any premise, will always be able to be proven to have property P in the conclusion, whether we reserve that point for debate or not.

So the Ontological Argument begs the question: it proposes God's existence in the premises, the very question to be determined. God is defined (or, if you please, conceived) as necessary in the premises; but whether God is necessary--whether you use the word "defined" or "conceived" or what have you--is precisely the question at hand. To put it in Anselm's language, it is not a given that "God is a being than which no greater can be conceived", but whether God is such a being--that is, exists--is precisely the question at hand. If we say, "I imagine God to be a being no greater than which can be conceived, but I don't know if this speculation is accurate," then I am no longer saying that God "is" a being than which no greater can be conceived, and so long as I merely say this is something I "imagine" we will never derive the conclusion that God really "is" such a being.

Thus, the Ontological Argument is invalid by virtue of slipping into the premises the very question at hand--it offers in the premises that God exists, and with a little muddled thought hides this, to derive the conclusion that he exists. God is "defined" or "conceived" as necessary, but so long as we are questioning his existence, this can never enter into the premises. The very question at hand is whether God is necessary--and if we define him as such it is easy to prove he exists. So to refute the argument at the beginning of this essay: no, it is not true that if God is possible he exists. If God is possibly necessary he is necessary; so whether he is possibly necessary is the question up for debate. To establish God as possible still lacks establishing him as possibly necessary; and to rely on a "definition" of God to do this automatically slips into our premises--when we define God as necessary--that he in fact exists.

Angelhaunt.net: Because earth's madness is heaven's sense.