Against Materialism

Suppose we have an object, say, a chunk of meteor in space that is the only thing that exists at all. For it to be true that this meteor exists, it does not require anything other than the meteor's material existence for this to be true. I used to go by the opinion that truth itself is always immaterial, since only language, and not material objects, can be true. Thus, if language is ultimately purely of a material ontology, it cannot be true any more than a stone or a tree can be true - language, if it is purely material, cannot be true or false.

But I do not hold that opinion anymore. For though no language at all exists in this universe where the meteor is the sole object that is, it would still be true that "The meteor exists." All that is required for "The meteor exists" to be true, is the meteor itself - a material thing. If it required something other than the meteor for this to be true, then mentally we would be able to subtract this "other thing" and contemplate the meteor free of it. But we cannot do this - so far as the meteor exists, all alone with everything else mentally stripped from it, so that nothing else is - yet it is still true that "The meteor exists." All that is required for this truth to be true is the material meteor itself - though we strip this world of everything material and immaterial but that meteor itself, it is still true that it exists. Thus, for truths to exist about a material object, it does not require anything other than that material object for the truths to be true about it; and, at least where we are in this essay so far, it does not imply the existence of anything but that material object. But as we push on further we shall find that, indeed, there are nonphysical - or cognitive - truths that are implied by the existence of the material meteor, which follow from it through logical necessity, and necessitate cognitive or nonmaterial existences.

If we suppose that saying what an object is implies many other things that it is not, this is one possible way to propound the idea that the meteor implies some ontological status for the myriad things it is not. When we say, "The meteor is the meteor," we equally say and imply, "The meteor is not the hammer," and, "The meteor is not the house," and so on for every other possible object there is.

But this is a little misleading, and there is a fallacy here. If all that exists is the meteor, then how did hammers and houses ever get introduced into the system? In this universe where the meteor is the sole thing that exists, is not saying, "The meteor is not the house" like saying, "The meteor is not the garfen"? - "garfen" being some nonsensical term that stands for nothing at all? So how does "The meteor is the meteor" imply any other thing that the meteor is not, if there is nothing else that exists to be excluded from what it is?

For any given object that exists, such as this meteor, it has at least some definite qualities. Say, for instance, that this meteor has 20 concave areas on its surface. So not only does the meteor exist, but the meteor's "20 concave areas of surface" exist. Now, it may be a fallacy to suppose that it depends upon any immaterial "truth" for it to be true that the meteor has these 20 concave areas. As we have said, for this to be true it does not require anything material or immaterial except those concave areas - material things - for it to be true that they exist.

But what about those "20 concave areas"? Certainly, then, "concave areas" are things that exist in this world, a world whose only object is the meteor. And if we do not suppose these concave areas exist, the meteor must have some other definite aspects or qualities in their place; everything that exists must have some aspect, quality or property. So, giving the meteor these 20 concave areas of surface, we find that from pure mathematical necessity, the idea that the meteor has 20 concave areas immediately makes possible - though not actual - the idea that it has any number of concave areas. This results from the pure mathematical concept of "20 objects". Once we allow a world wherein there are a number of objects, we allow, since those objects are indeed of a definite number, the logical possibility for any number of them. The idea of a number of concave areas leads, necessarily, to the non-actual possibility of half, twice, one quarter, three times, and so on, of those concave areas. With the meteor's "20 concave areas", it follows from this and the truths of pure arithmetic, that there be possible any number of them. Formerly we rejected the object "house" as being nonsense, there being no such thing in this imaginary world that the noun corresponds to. But for the things we do allow as having material existence, from their existence follows the logical - but non-actual - possibility of any definite number of them. That "There exist concave areas" follows, as implied necessarily, "There exist a number of concave areas." If the number "20" is something, would the number itself make any sense at all, if it were not accompanied by all the other infinite numbers, and the necessary arithmetical relations between them? Does the number "20" make any sense if it is the only number that there is? Could there be "20 concave areas" if the term "100 concave areas" had no meaning at all? And if it has meaning, then it has the ontology of a possible number of concave areas, possible but non-actual, and therefore non-material.

What is the nature of this "possibility"? It is obviously not material; according to the material, there are 20 concave areas, no more and no less. Thus, it requires us to assign an existence to the possible but non-actual and non-material. That is, the counterfactual. To say "There are exactly 20 concave areas" means also "There are not 100 concave areas"; and thus, these "100 concave areas" do not exist materially, but they do so cognitively. Now we have found something immaterial that the material implies, and requires for it to be. It requires the possibility (necessary possibility) for things about it that are not the material case but nevertheless possibly the material case.

This "possible but not true number of concave areas" cannot have a physical ontology; otherwise, if it did, there must actually be such a meteor for every possible meteor. But no - we have said the meteor is the only thing that is, and have come to the conclusion, then, that all its possible but not actual numbers of concave areas must have some existence. They have a cognitive existence, though no mind at all contemplates them. They are Platonic in nature - that is, mental while requiring no mind to know them - and exist in a realm of non-material possibility, non-material insofar as they are not actual. Of course, this is not exhaustive of the possible but not actual states of the meteor whose existence the actual meteor implies. In fact, there are so many mathematical and quantitative possible relations between the meteor's parts and aspects that it would take volumes to list them all. A single other example, a little different in quality from the "20 concave areas" will do.

Suppose there is a single concave area, with a given distance between its left edge and its right edge. So we have a given distance of a certain quantity - or do we? One thing more is required - a unit. So long as that distance stands in relation to nothing at all, it is a distance, a quantity, but not any specific quantity.

Somewhere else upon the meteor we find our unit. Suppose there is a vein of ice on its surface, approximately one-fifth the length of the concave area. Now, this vein of ice stands in relation to the concave area as one-fifth its diameter. If we were to measure this diameter, using the length of the vein of ice as our unit, it would properly be called a discovery of that relation rather than either an invention of it or arbitrary definition. That mathematical relation between the two quantitative objects exists necessarily. That they exist with the given relative quantities of length they have, and that their quantities stand in relation, is true and necessary whether someone contemplates them at all. If someone were someone to discover that quantitative relation, does anyone suppose it did not exist before such a discovery, or that its existence and true mathematical relation would have been delayed from existing a year had the discovery taken a year more to be made?

But this is not all. Does the proposition "The concave area is five times the length of the vein of ice" make any sense at all if the proposition "The concave area is two times the length of the vein of ice" means nothing at all? Thus, if "Five times the length of the vein of ice" is something, so is "Four times the length of the vein of ice", "Twice the length of the vein of ice", and "Half the length of the vein of ice" and so on. Their actual quantitative relation is absolutely meaningless unless there is some ontological status for every one of their possible, but not actual, quantitative relations, as meaningless as saying the number 5 makes sense without any other number existing. Thus, we have another way in which there is one actual and material quantitative relation, which requires and implies the immaterial possibility of myriad non-actual - but very real - quantitative relations. These are, again, in a cognitive realm of logical and quantitative possibility; but since they are not actual, these possibilities are not material, though they do exist as cognitive possibilities.

There are any number of possible quantitative relations that are not actual or material, but implied by the existence of the material meteor; so many it dizzies the mind to think of explicating every one, or even every kind of them. I hope the two examples will do in convincing the reader of the existence of the cognitive, immaterial existence in the realm of non-actual possibility.

The conclusion we have come to is that anything material implies myriad non-material entities. These are not "minds" or "the ghost in the machine" or the ordinary subjects of the mind/body dualism debate, which is the common topic of discussion when it comes to debunking materialism. I have not taken up the usual topics of mind/body dualism for my treatment, though I hope to have shown that materialism is not tenable; not because of its inability to explain the existence of minds or spiritual entities; but simply because the existence of material entities requires, and implies, the existence of myriad possible states that are not actual and therefore not material.

No one should read this and suppose I require any God or mind to contemplate immaterial truths and realities (such as non-actual but possible states and quantitative relations). In fact I do not think it is any more hard to imagine that a given cognitive, immaterial truth can exist without any mind to conceive it, than it is to suppose a material object can exist with nothing living to see it. Had there never been such a thing as "life" to begin with, according to the perspective of us humans, nothing would exist. But though to us nothing would exist, the world would still exist; it would simply remain true and real with no life or mind that knows it.