[Ontology, Language & Logic: Essays]
[Angelhaunt Home]

[That it has Forever Been Impossible for Nothing to have Ever Existed] (2004)
[The Relative and the Absolute] (2004)
[That All Events are Unique] (2004)
[Subjectivity and Objectivity] (2004)
[That the Cognitive is Prior to the Material] (2004)
[Against Materialism] (2005)
[Perception and What Is Perceived] (2005)
[On the Relation Between Thought and Reality] (2005)
[That Causality is Never a Logically Necessary Relation] (2005)
[In Defense of Kant's View of Space and Time] (2005)
[The Ontology of Literature] (2005)
[The Purely Positive Aspect of Knowledge] (2006)
[The Nature of Contingency] (2005)
[Toward a New Cognitive/Material Parallelism] (2005)



That It Has Forever Been Impossible
For Nothing to Have Ever Existed

Propositions that universally deny, if they fall into the class of things which they themselves deny, must necessarily be false. It is for this reason that "No proposition is true" and "I know I know nothing" must be false. The former because it is a proposition; and if no proposition is true it itself denies its own truth; the latter because if we know this proposition, we know something; in the same way it is rendered absurd.

Not all universal denials work this way. One might suppose that the proposition "Nothing that happens, happens according to a rule" may fall into the category of the former absurdities, for the reason that it itself is the rule by which those "things that happen not according to any rule" themselves happen. But this is a mistake: the proposition is not a rule at all, but a denial that there is any rule to things that happen. To call it a rule makes the same error as supposing that the proposition "Nothing caused the Big Bang" means there was a thing, "Nothing", that was the Big Bang's cause. In fact, it is a denial that anything caused it; in the same way, "Nothing that happens, happens according to a rule," is not a rule itself, but a denial that there is a rule for events. It does not fall into the category of the things that it itself denies, and so it is not necessarily false.

Thus, if a proposition is a universal denial, if and only if it falls into the class of things that it itself denies, is it necessarily absurd. The denial of the rule of non-contradiction falls into this class as well. Suppose some sophomoric student shall question it in class, as many philosophers have done in their youth. "What would you say if I deny that only one of two contradictory propositions can be true?" he asks the professor. "I shall say that a true contradiction is impossible," the professor replies. "But what you just said depends upon the rule's veracity, instead of proving it," replies the student. The professor of course will say, "What you just said depends upon its veracity just as much." Aristotle had a similar method of dealing with the question, saying if a man denies it is true, he must not reason out loud; and if he speaks aloud - even against it - he must assume its truth. The proposition that "There are some true contradictions," if it is to be coherent speech, must assume that there are no true contradictions; for any speech that does not so assume this may as well be rendered into nonsensical sounds, if indeed there are true contradictions. The whole of philosophy, and even communication at any level, is undermined, if there are true contradictions. Thus, the proposition, "There are some true contradictions," negates its very nature as a proposition. One might object that this is not a proof of the rule proper, since it is circular reasoning to assume its veracity in the very reasoning that establishes the validity of the rule. But on the one hand, we have the option of a circular defense of the rule of non-contradiction; or on the other hand the option of an argument that proposes that there are true contradictions, which in the process undermines its own nature as coherent speech. We either have the option to be circularly self-supporting or absurdly self-negating. Perhaps we shall have to be satisfied with this.

The point of the title of this text shall presently be clear. For suppose that nothing should have ever existed at all. If so, that "Nothing exists" would be true. Thus the proposition "Nothing exists" denies the very class of things that it itself denies. If "Nothing exists" is true, then we must admit that a truth exists. If a truth exists, that "Nothing exists" is false. Again, it is a universal denial that falls into the class of things that it itself denies. Certainly a universal denial so universal as to deny the existence of everything, with any level of ontology, denies its own truth and existence as such, and so has become absurd. This of course does not mean that it is necessary that matter, the phenomenal world, and life must exist. But whether there is a God or not, whether there is a material world or not, whether there is consciousness or not, that something exists, must be true. For nothing to exist, it could not even be true that nothing exists, since in such a world not even a truth can exist; and if it is true that nothing exists, then it follows that something must exist. Thus it is impossible that nothing should have ever existed, and at no time in history has there been a state when nothing at all existed. Necessary truths are truths that cannot at any time, anywhere, be false; and thus something has forever existed, and there will always be something that exists.


Angelhaunt.net: Because earth's madness is heaven's sense.