The Purely Positive Aspect
of Knowledge

Let us take an example, in a discussion of epistemology, where all reasonable people will agree that the subject believes a certain false P and is clearly deceived, and another example where a different subject will believe the same (this time true) P and clearly know it to be true. The given P is such that the belief is the same for both subjects, but the P is true for one and false for the other, since the P in question relates to the subjects themselves.

For the first example, let us suppose that a diagnosed schizophrenic--whom we shall name Martin--who is neither a celebrity nor at all in the news, watches Jay Leno's monologue and hears a joke regarding a celebrity governor of California, and firmly believes it has reference to him. Though he is diagnosed schizophrenic, he does not know this, since, as is the case with many schizophrenics, he does not believe he is schizophrenic at all, no matter what delusions he's had or hospitalizations he's experienced.

Now, on the other hand, let us suppose that Arnold Schwarzenegger is watching the same Jay Leno monologue, hears the same joke about a celebrity governor of California, and, though his name is not mentioned, Arnold Schwarzenegger believes--quite correctly--that the joke has reference to him in particular; in fact he clearly knows this. On the one hand, then, we have a belief by the schizophrenic Martin that Jay Leno's joke refers to him in particular. Does anybody question that Martin does not truly know this, but rather is caught in the middle of illusion, brought about by his brain disease? And on the other hand, Arnold Schwarzenegger--governor of California himself--is watching the same show, is equally convinced that the joke has reference to him. Does anybody suppose that Arnold does not in fact know, and know truly, that the Jay Leno joke refers to him?

Let us take another pair of examples. As much as Descartes was right that perceptions of the physical world do not constitute proof of a material world as their cause, he was wrong to suppose that a waking man does not in fact know that he is not dreaming. Though each night I dream and am deceived in the dream into thinking I am awake, yet right now I know for a true fact that I am neither asleep nor dreaming. True, it may be that my perceptions of the world are not caused by an objective material reality outside of my perceptions. But, leaving this issue aside, can I suppose that it is possible--given the obvious difference between the dreaming consciousness and the waking consciousness--that I am presently dreaming? I take it as evident fact that I know truly that I am not dreaming; there is simply too much characteristic of a dreaming consciousness that I am not currently experiencing--confusion in perceptions, disregard of logic, cloudiness of the mind, and innumerable other aspects of dream life that are not currently present. And on the positive side, I have clarity of thought, coherence of perception, and many other things that never apply to the dream world. I cannot escape the conclusion that in the present moment, I know and know truly that I am not asleep nor dreaming. At the same time, I have to admit that when in fact I am dreaming, I believe myself awake, but am deceived by the poor mental capacity that attends the dreaming consciousness. On the one hand I have a waking state wherein my mental faculties are obviously (both ontologically epistemically speaking), not impaired, and I know them to be sound and my state to be a waking state. And on the other hand, when I am dreaming in fact, I have (again, ontologically speaking) an impaired mental function, the result of which is that no matter how convinced I am that I am awake, I am in fact dreaming, and can be deceived by the impaired mental function attending the dream into thinking myself awake. And the impaired mental function attendant to the dream is so strong that I am even completely unaware that my mental function is impaired at all, when I am dreaming.

In both these pairs of examples, we have, on the one hand, a given belief P--false for one subject and true for the other. Martin believes the Jay Leno joke refers to him; he is wrong and does not know this, due to an impaired mental function. Governor Schwartzenegger believes the same P; he not only is correct, but he has clear knowledge that he is correct: he knows he's right in his idea that the Jay Leno joke refers to him. He not only believes this, but knows it, and knows himself not to be deceived. Similarly, in my dreaming state at night, I am perfectly convinced I am awake; I am in this case deceived and caught in illusion. But just as with Governor Schwartzenegger knowing he's right, in my waking state I know myself to be awake, truly and categorically.

How this comes about, I believe, is the following. In my case where I presently know myself to be awake, the thing that clinches this as true knowledge for me presently is that my mental capacity is not in any way impaired--which impairment is always the state of my dreaming, and deceived, consciousness. So long as--ontologically speaking--I am in fact awake, I can know clearly and categorically that I am in fact awake. In my dreaming state, ontologically speaking, my mental capacity is impaired, which leads to my state of illusion and false belief.

In the same way, Governor Schwartzenegger's mental state is not impaired, and he does in fact know the Jay Leno joke to refer to him. He knows, furthermore, that he is not schizophrenic or mentally ill, and that he is in fact a celebrity governor of California; and it is a perfectly evident, truly known fact that the Jay Leno joke has reference to him. But like my dreaming self, the schizophrenic Martin--watching the same show--is deceived through a mental impairment, such that he neither knows himself to be impaired nor realizes that what he takes for knowledge is in fact delusion.

So now we take our discussion to its cardinal question, presently taking these two pairs of examples under the single heading of the dreaming/awake example, everything said applying to both examples. When I am convinced that I am awake, do I in fact know this categorically? Can I know this, with the attendant fact that when I am in fact dreaming I believe myself awake as strongly as I believe so now? What this puzzle of epistemology boils down to is a question of ontology, upon which the epistemology all depends. If I am in fact awake--ontologically speaking--since my mental faculty is not impaired, I do in fact know this, and know truly that I am not dreaming. On the other hand, if I am in fact dreaming, no matter how convinced I be that I am awake, I do not know I am awake (nor is it true). The question of epistemology, then, hinges on ontology. I truly and categorically know myself to be awake when I am awake; when sleeping, I do not know I am sleeping. When ontologically and factually awake, I know myself to be awake; when ontologically and factually dreaming, I do not know myself to be dreaming, nor do I know that I do not know this. This scheme is what I call the purely positive aspect of knowledge; knowledge present is known to be present, and knowledge absent is not known to be absent.

Knowledge, then, in these cases is a purely positive thing: when the belief is true, it is clear that we have knowledge of it, and know that we know; while, negatively speaking, if the belief is false, we do not know it is false, nor know that we do not know. Knowledge, where it is present, is clearly such; I know clearly and categorically right now that I am not dreaming, by virtue of the mental clarity attendant to my being not in fact dreaming. When the belief "I am not dreaming" is true, I know it to be true, and know that I know; when it is false, I do not know that it is false, nor know that I do not know.

This idea of the purely positive nature of knowledge does not, needless to say, account for all knowledge or all types of it; nor for all types of deception and falsity. But at least we can say that the purely positive nature of knowledge, such that when I know P, I know that I know; and when I do not know, I do not know I do not know--at least this is a type of dynamic that applies to some, though not all, epistemic puzzles dealing with the possibilities of being deceived by our experience. It applies, specifically, to those epistemic puzzles that deal with beliefs that arise from mental impairment, such as the dreaming state or delusions.

Angelhaunt.net: Because earth's madness is heaven's sense.